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FLYING THE UNFRIENDLY SKIES: A YEAR OF
REORGANIZING AIRLINES, AIRCRAFT
LESSORS, AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE*
ANTHONY MICHAEL SABINO**

PREAMBLE
MERICAN AIRLINES Chairman Robert L. Crandall
-has a favorite line he uses to describe 1991. 'The
only heartening thing we can say is that it's over.' "' Over
the last year the U.S. air carrier industry has conclusively
proven the oldest adage of aviation: "what goes up, must
come down." And down they have come, directly into the
bankruptcy courts in the financial equivalent of a crash
landing. The roster of infamy is startling indeed; Eastern,
Pan Am, TWA, Continental, Midway, America West, and
Braniff (again!). In addition, Northwest has narrowly
averted its own emergency landing into insolvency. While
apathy on the part of a flying public resigned to such
events has apparently taken hold, creditors and lessors
"A
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solely those of the author.
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and St. John's University College of Business Administration (B.S. 1980). He was
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states of New York and Pennsylvania, Mr. Sabino is presently associated with the
New York City law firm of Marks & Murase. He is also an adjunct Professor of
Law, St. John's University College of Business Administration.
The author dedicates this article to Emil G. Pesiri, Esq., Jackson, Tufts, Cole &
Black, San Francisco, with deepest thanks for providing the encouragement and
support that made this article possible.
I Wendy Zedlnea, The Airlines Are Killing Each Other Again, Bus. Wx., June 8,
1992, at 32.
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are much less likely to react so complacently to a carrier's
2
bankruptcy filing or the tension leading up to it.
This lack of complacency stems from the fact that aircraft lessors in particular, historically viewed as special
parties in interest, have been granted unique protections
by section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1110 of
the modern insolvency law is designed to provide special
protections to a secured party with a purchase money
equipment security interest (PMESI) in a lessor or a conditional vendor of "aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers,
appliances, or spare parts."'3 Pursuant to the statute,
2 See Larry Reibstein & Dody Tsiantar, On the Wings of Bankruptcy, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 21, 1991, at 45. Indeed, some have espoused the view that bankruptcy "more
adequately serves the entire airline industry than direct government economic
regulation." Jeffrey S. Heuer & Musette H. Vogel, Airlines in the Wake of Deregulation: Bankruptcy as an Alternative to Economic Regulation, 19 TRANSP. LJ. 247, 249
(1991). These commentators have concluded that:
Where deregulation has failed, bankruptcy has adequately filled the
gap. It has kept some airlines flying and sold off the effective parts
of airlines that could not stay afloat. It has balanced the interests of
all concerned, including the government and the public on a
microeconomic level that has produced positive results on a larger
scale. Bankruptcy does not and will not trample the ability of strong
airlines to effectively run their business. It is an excellent complement to economic deregulation.
Id. at 286.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1988). The statute's text is as follows:
The right of a secured party with a purchase-money equipment security interest in, or of a lessor or conditional vendor of, whether as
trustee or otherwise, aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts, as defined in section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301), or vessels of the United States, as
defined in subsection B(4) of the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46
U.S.C. 911(4)), that are subject to a purchase-money equipment security interest granted by, leased to, or conditionally sold to, a
debtor that is an air carrier operating under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board, or a water
carrier that holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity or
permit issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, as the case
may be, to take possession of such equipment in compliance with the
provisions of a purchase-money equipment security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract, as the case may be, is not affected
by section 362 or 363 of this title or by any power of the court to
enjoin such taking of possession, unless(1) before 60 days after the date of the order for relief under this
chapter, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, agrees to perform all obligations of the debtor that become due on or after such
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creditors under its protection may compel a debtor to
cure all pre-petition defaults within sixty days following
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. If the debtor fails to
do so within that period, the creditor is exempted from
the automatic stay and may repossess the subject
property.
As stated by one appellate court, Congress designed
the extraordinary relief accorded certain aircraft financiers by the statute "in order to encourage investment in
new equipment for air carriers." '4 Similarly, another commentary noted that "[ilt is axiomatic among the aircraft
financing fraternity that section 1110 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides essential protection to those who lease or
finance the purchase of aircraft."15 Indeed,
[s]ection 1110 stands in stark contrast to sections 362, the
automatic stay provision, and 365, the assumption or rejection of executory contracts or leases provision, of the
Code. Congress obviously saw a need for this type of special legislation in order to protect certain persons who
deal with air carriers. 6
The unique nature of section 1110's special protections
is justified by the singular risks attendant to aircraft financing. As summarized in another commentary, there
are four major elements that distinguish financing transdate under such security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, as the case may be; and
(2) any default, other than a default of a kind specified in section
365(b) (2) of this title, under such security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, as the case may be(A) that occurred before such date is cured before the expiration of such 60-day period; and
(B) that occurs after such date is cured before the later of(i) 30 days after the date of such default; and
(ii) the expiration of such 60-day period.
4 California Chieftan v. Air Vermont, Inc. (In re Air Vermont, Inc.), 761 F.2d
130, 132 (2d Cir. 1985).
5 James W. Giddens & Sandor E. Schick, Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code: Time
for Refueling?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 109 (1990).
6 In re Pan Am Corp., 124 B.R. 960, 965 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), afd in part, 125 B.R.
372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2248
(1991).
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actions in aircraft from the ordinary commercial deal: 1)
the size of the financing - one of the most cost-intensive
investments in the business world; 2) the "lengthy economic life and extended financing terms associated with"
aircraft; 3) the inevitable rapid deterioration in value if the
aircraft is not regularly used and maintained; and 4) its
inherent mobility, making location and recovery of the
collateral difficult. 7 In short, a financier "is faced with an
exceptionally high-cost, long-term investment secured by
collateral that may be subject to rapid deterioration if it
remains in the hands of a bankrupt during potentially
lengthy reorganization proceedings." 8
Conversely, there are negative ramifications that would
surely follow from not granting exceptional treatment to
aircraft financiers.
Restrictions on repossession discourage financing and increase lending rates. Risks to collateral increase the
longer a financially precarious debtor maintains control of
the asset in question. Moreover, if transaction costs, such
as attorneys' fees, are necessary for a lender to regain control of collateral, the overall loan costs may rise accordingly. The practical ramifications in the financial market
of restrictions on the lender's right to seize and protect
collateral were not lost on the draftsmen
of the original
9
bankruptcy laws or the successor Code.
The importance to the economy of maintaining stability
in the aircraft finance area cannot be overstated. For instance, since 1985 investors have devoted almost $2 billion to various public limited partnerships that lease used
aircraft.' 0 With such huge amounts of capital at risk and
the imminent fleet modernizations of this decade hanging
in the balance, an appreciation of how close to financial
7 Glenn S.Gerstell & Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, Aviation Financing Problems Under
Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1987).
'

Id. at 6.

Louis B. Goldman et al., Repossessing the Spirit of St. Louis: Expanding the Protection of Sections 1110 and 1168 of the Bankruptcy Code, 41 Bus. LAw. 29, 29 (1985).
10 Todd Vogel & Kevin Kelly, Hold On - Polaris is Trailing Smoke, Bus. WK., Apr.
8, 1991, at 28.
9
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disaster the airline industry has come in the last few
months is vital. These recent airline bankruptcies nearly
drove both creditors and air carriers into utter chaos. The
industry was saved only by sound judicial reasoning.
Having outlined the essence of the situation, the purpose of this article is first to make a comprehensive review
of the historical underpinnings of section 1110, the keystone to this entire discussion. With the benefit and wisdom of more than four decades, we may intelligently
analyze the recent flurry of cases dealing with the scope of
the statute, particularly as to specific types of modem
lease forms not necessarily contemplated by the original
drafters of section 1110.
Because our discussion would be unnecessarily limited
by their exclusion, this article also examines a number of
contemporaneous cases that, while they do not as obviously implicate section 1110, are essential to any discussion of the experiences of creditors and debtor airlines
alike in past years. Note is also taken of the recent call by
the industry's major players for legislative revision to clarify the various points of fatigue in the framework of the
Bankruptcy Code's special protection for airline creditors.
With all that having been said, clearance is now given to
embark on our airborne journey.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislative history of section 1110 and the policy
concerns upon which it was based flow naturally from the
circumstances surrounding its 1978 enactment as part of
the modern Bankruptcy Code. In analyzing the statute,
however, an understanding of the antecedents upon
which it was modeled yields a wealth of knowledge and
guidance and sets forth in detail the entrenched history of
these exceptional protections for certain creditors.
A.

THE BANKRUPTCY ACT'S SECTION

770)

Section 1110 has its roots in section 77(j) of the former
Bankruptcy Act. Section 77(j), enacted in 1935, applied
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to certain transactions involving railroad rolling stock and
provided that:
The title of any owner, whether as trustee or otherwise, to
rolling stock equipment leased or conditionally sold to the
debtor, and any right of such owner to take possession of
such property in compliance with the provisions of any
such lease or conditional sale contract, shall not be affected by the provisions of this section."
Previously, the law had permitted federal courts to stay
any suit affecting a railroad in reorganization.
This provision was enacted to preserve a form of financing known as the "railroad equipment trust," under which
transportation equipment was financed separately from a
railroad's other assets. The equipment was placed in a
trust and leased or conditionally sold to the railroad. Traditionally, railroad equipment trustees received priority
over holders of general liens on a railroad's after-acquired
property. 12 This special protection was permitted because the high cost and long life span of rolling stock,
combined with the railroads' frequently precarious financial situations, made such equipment an extraordinarily
risky investment. Such risks were magnified if the secured
property could not be recovered promptly in bankruptcy
3
proceedings. '
Congress enacted section 77(j) in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway,' 4
which casts doubt upon the ability of equipment trust financiers to repossess their equipment in bankruptcy proceedings. If this ability were denied, financing would
become more expensive for the railroads. Thus, Congress passed section 77(j) to ensure that these financiers
could act immediately upon their contractual rights of
repossession.
I
2
"
'4

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 77(j), 11 U.S.C. § 205(j)(repealed 1976).
See United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1871).
See Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 7, at 5-6.
294 U.S. 648 (1935).
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As one congressional report stated:
In view of the necessity of readily financing purchases of
equipment at a time when the development of the transportation art is providing new forms of equipment, particularly in the passenger field, of which in interests of
efficiency and economy, the carriers should be able to
avail themselves, and because after a depression the carriers are usually required to make large expenditures for
equipment in order to accommodate the improved traffic,
your committee is of the opinion that any doubt should be
removed with reference to the validity of the equipment
trust as a means of financing equipment purchases.' 5
B.

SECTION

116(5)

OF THE REVISED ACT

In 1957, Congress extended section 77(j) to the growing airline industry. It enacted into the former Bankruptcy Act section 116(5), which provided, in part, that:
the title of any owner, whether as trustee or otherwise, to
aircraft... leased, subleased, or conditionally sold to any
air carrier ...and any right of such owner or of any other

lessor to such air carrier to take possession of such property in compliance with the provisions of any such lease or
conditional sale contract shall not be affected by the provisions of this chapter if the terms of such lease or conditional sale so provide.' 6
The legislative history of this section reveals that Congress was concerned that "[m]any of the Nation's smaller
airlines are today facing serious financing problems resulting from the need to replace obsolete equipment with
modern aircraft.' 7 This serious financial condition resulted because "the smaller lines [were] unable to attract
the capital necessary for their reequipment requirements."' 8 Congress hoped that the statute "would result
15 H.R.REP. No. 1288, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4 (1935).

13Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 116(5), 11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (repealed 1976).
17 H.R. REP. No. 944, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1926, 1926.
8 Id.
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in an increased availability of capital and at a lower interest rate than would be demanded under present conditions," and would cause "extensive use of equipment
trust financing as the financial basis for a major reequipment program."19
In 1968, Congress extended this provision to the shipping industry. 20 The legislative history of the section indicated that Congress was concerned with "problems of
equipment obsolescence and the resulting need for capital improvements as the industry continue[d] to modernize its fleet for service to the public."' 2' Once again,
Congress hoped that these protections would "result in
an increased availability of capital, and at a lower interest
rate than would be demanded under present
conditions. "22
C.

SECTION

1110 OF THE MODERN BANKRUPTCY CODE

When the current Bankruptcy Code was enacted in
1978, the new section 1110 adopted the old section
116(5), but in a somewhat altered form. Holders of
PMESI's were added to the list of protected creditors, and
debtors were given the option of curing their defaults
within a specified time period. The addition of the PMESI
acknowledged the changes brought on by the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which subsumed the conditional sale contract, and recognized the purchase money
priority. 3
As one congressional report stated, "[b]ecause retention of the prior limitation would unnecessarily force
equipment financing transactions into outmoded forms,
protection of security interests was added to make financ9 Id. at 1926-27.

See Bankruptcy Act § 116(6), 11 U.S.C. § 516(6) (repealed 1976).
H.R. REP. No. 1932, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4279, 4280.
20
21

22

Id.

23 See U.C.C.

§ 9-312(4) (1978) (recognizing non-inventory purchase money

priority). Official Comment 3 to section 9-312 holds that purchase money priority
embodies previous priority for conditional sales and equipment trusts.
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ing forms more flexible and more consonant with modem
law." ' 24 The cure period was apparently added to soften
which were considered
the impact of the prior laws,
25
"harsh in their application.
Although Congress noted that "changes in financing
practices and in the bankruptcy laws have suggested that
the former limitation [of protection] be deleted, '26 lessors
and conditional vendors remained protected by section
1110. The House report recognized that the Uniform
Commercial Code treated certain purported leases as disguised security interests but made no other distinction
among leases. 7 Rather, Congress appeared to recognize
that the protection for leases and conditional sales contracts was maintained because a holder of such an interest
retained title to the property.
The PMESI, which does not transfer title to the holder,
was discussed separately. As the House report noted:
An attempt was made to preserve the limitations on the
right of the financier contained in current law. However,
certain changes were made. First, the proposed sections
provide protection for equipment security interests. The
term includes only security interests that were granted to
finance the acquisition of the covered equipment. A general mortgage is excluded. Under present law, the protection applies only to leases and conditional sales of
equipment. The theory behind the present limitation is
that under leases and conditional sales, title of the property does not pass to the debtor but remains in the financier. Thus, it is appropriate to exclude what is not
property of the estate from the automatic stay in a reorganization case. 28
It would therefore seem that section 1110 was based upon
two distinct theories: a "title" rationale that applied to
24 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963 and 6200.
25 Id. at 239, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6198.
26 Id. at 240, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6199.
27 Id.
21 Id.
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leases and conditional sales contracts; and a more contemporary "purchase money" rationale that applied to
PMESI's.
The House report also stated that "[t]he protection afforded the financier is similar to that contained in other
sections of the bill governing use of collateral by the estate and the treatment of executory contracts and
unexpired leases.''29 Specifically, the report noted that,
when a trustee elects to assume a lease, the lessor is entitled to adequate protection, which ordinarily includes
rental payments and the curing of past defaults.3 0 The
House report found that
[t]he major differences for transportation equipment security interests is that the proposed section defines more
precisely what constitutes adequate protection .... In the

case of a lease, the protection is the same afforded to other
lessors, but the trustee is required 3to make a decision
within 60 days of the order for relief. '
In sum, the term "lease" in section 1110 specifically defined the general treatment of leases elsewhere in the
Code.
Also instructive in this area is GA TX Leasing Corp. v. Airlift International, Inc.3 2 in which the court summarized the

purpose and effect of section 1110. Noting that "changes
in financing practices made it necessary to protect different types of security interests in equipment," and that the
modem statute extends just such protections, Judge Clark
stated:
Section 1110, and its companion statute section 1168
which covers railroad rolling stock, represent amended
versions of section 77(j), 116(5) and 116(6) of the prior
Bankruptcy Act. These sections generally provided that
- Id. at 239, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6199.
30 Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988) (on request of a party with an interest in
property, the court may condition its use, sale, or lease on "adequate protection"
of such interest).
31 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 23, at 240, reprinted in1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6199. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988) (treatment of unexpired leases).
32 (In re Airlift Int'l, Inc.), 761 F.2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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equipment financiers could repossess their collateral upon
default despite the filing of a bankruptcy petition if both
non-bankruptcy law and the underlying loan agreement
permitted repossession. The purpose of those sections
was to enhance the borrowing ability of airlines, maritime
shippers, and railroads by offering equipment financiers
greater certainty with regard to their
ability to protect col3
lateral in a bankruptcy proceeding. 3
In sum, section I 110 boasts an established lineage of
prior statutory embodiments, each equally blessed with a
fairly well-stated legislative history. The consistent
themes included therein may be summarized as: 1) exceptional treatment in the bankruptcy laws for aircraft (as
well as railroad and ocean vessel) financiers; 2) steadfast
protection for lessors and vendors in this area, later augmented by more of the same for purchase money security
interests; 3) fleet upgrading as the real aim of Congress in
enacting these laws; and 4) segregation of general mortgage interests from those mentioned above and others
similarly situated, while limiting the unique protections of
section 1110 and its ancestors solely to the latter group of
special creditors.
II.

SALE/LEASEBACKS - BEGINNING WITH
BRANIFF

Although destined to be left in the contrails of the more
notorious airline bankruptcies that followed, the insolvency of Braniff, Inc. provided the first major battle of the
conflict between debtors and lessors over the application
of section 1110. While subsequently overshadowed by
later decisions in the circuit courts of appeals, the bankruptcy court in Orlando, Florida put forth a concise and
33 Id. at 1507 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 238-39 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787). See 5 LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcY, § 1110.01 (15th ed. 1979); see also Seidle v. GATX Leasing Corp., 778
F.2d 659, 663 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that section 1110 encourage
new financing of... airplanes.").
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cogent opinion that laid the cornerstone for jurisprudence yet to come.
In Braniff, Inc. v. Toren 4 the debtor airline had commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory
judgment that section 1110 did not apply to certain aircraft leases. The unique facts are worthy of mention here,
as they set this particular reorganization apart from the
ones that followed it. The instant debtor, Braniff, Inc.
(Braniff), was actually the successor to Braniff Airways,
Inc. (Airways), which had entered into its own Chapter 11
reorganization in 1982. The leases in question were done
pursuant to the confirmed reorganization plan of Airways,
which called for the leasing to Braniff ofjets formerly operated by Airways.35 Unfortunately, history repeated itself
and Braniff filed its own petition to reorganize in late
1989.
On cross-motions for summary judgment in the case,
Braniff argued that section 1110 applied only to aircraft
and equipment "newly acquired by an air carrier
lessee."'36 The leases, Braniff asserted, "merely permitted
the implementation of the plan of reorganization of Braniff Airways." ' 37 The debtor argued that, since the transaction at issue in effect refinanced the assets of its defunct
predecessor but did not involve a bona fide acquisition,
the special protections of section 1110 did not apply.
In considering this case, Bankruptcy Judge C. Timothy
Corcoran III wasted no time in establishing the rule of law
to be applied. The court ruled that:
[e]ach of the elements set forth in Section 1110 of the
Bankruptcy Code is satisfied on the facts of this case.
There is a (i) lessor (ii) of property of the required type
(iii) that has been leased to an air carrier debtor of the
requisite type, and (iv) the terms of the Lease provide for
the lessor to take possession of the property upon default.
In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) [hereinafter Braniff I].
Id. at 981-82.
mi Id. at 981.
.1 Braniff , 110 B.R. at 981.
34
35
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On its face, therefore, Section 1110 applies.3 8
Braniff contended that section 1110 did not apply because the aircraft were not new to the airline, and the
Congressional intent behind the statute was to specially
protect lessors of newly acquired aircraft only."9 "Section
1110 was designed by Congress to encourage the availability of new capital equipment to airlines at costs less
than would otherwise be required to be charged," asserted the debtor, not to "facilitate the reorganization of a
debtor airline," as in the case at bar.4 ° Braniff urged the
court to ignore the face of the statute and to consider instead the legislative record, which they believed demonstrated that the lawmakers limited the scope of section
1110 to acquisition leases alone.
Judge Corcoran was unpersuaded by the debtor's
points. Defining the "threshold issue" as the proper construction of the statute, considered in conjunction with
the relevant legislative history, the court first declared unequivocally that section 1110 was "clear and unambiguous" and that its4 prerequisites for usage "obviously ha[d]
been satisfied." '
Examining the legislative history for any contradictions
to that precept, the court noted that when aircraft owners
were first brought under this umbrella of special protections in 1957, these unique remedies were limited to
transactions involving leases and conditional sales. 42 It
was not until the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Code in
1978, commented the bankruptcy judge, that this special
treatment was expanded to include purchase money secured transactions. 43 It should therefore come as no surprise, said the court, to find that "references to new
acquisitions were featured prominently" in the legislative
s,Id. at 982.

19Braniff apparently conceded that section 1110 covered leases of both used
and newly manufactured airplanes if the equipment was newly acquired. Id.
40 Braniff , 110 B.R. at 982.
41 Id. at 982-83.
42 Id. at 983.
.sId.
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history of section 11 10. 44 Yet "without also examining
the earlier base from which the expansion was being
made," the conclusion drawn from the prior expansion of
the statutory penumbra is distorted.45
Rejecting the debtor's tunnel vision of the legislative
record, the bankruptcy court found "no support for the
proposition that new acquisitions were intended to underlie, and be a necessary prerequisite for, the protections
afforded lessors" by the statute.4 6 Looking not only to the
legislative history of section 1110 but also to its post-war
ancestor as well, Judge Corcoran concluded:
[Congress] placed nothing in the bill or in the report suggesting that the benefits afforded by the bill would be limited to lessors of acquisition leases. This is significant
because the stated purpose of the bill - protecting lessors
and conditional sellers - facilitates the reduction of capital costs to an airline regardless of whether the transaction
contemplates the acquisition of new equipment (by a new
lease, for example) or the refinancing of existing equipment (by the renewal of an existing lease, for example).47
The Judge felt that the lawmakers intent in 1978 as to
purchase money security interests did not affect the special protections afforded lessors. In support of this proposition, he noted that "nothing suggests that Congress
intended to change the law that had then
existed for some
48
transactions.
lease
20 years regarding
Almost as an aside, Judge Corcoran found that section
1110 imposed no "acquisition" requirement for a "lessor" of covered equipment. 49 Nothing, therefore, justified an additional requirement for leases under section
1110.50 In concluding, the court ruled that "section 1110
is not limited to leases that permit aircraft to be newly ac44

Id.

45

d.

46

Id.

47 Id. at 984.
48 Branif 1, 110 B.R.
49 Id. at 984 n. 1.

- Id. at 984.

at 984.
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quired by the lessee."'5 Apparently to buttress this finding, the court added that, although Braniff was conceived
out of the Airways reorganization, the lease in question
involved aircraft new to Braniff. Since the benefits of section 11 10 helped Braniff acquire the leased property, this
application of section 1110 was consistent with the Congressional intent to encourage acquisition financing.5 2
For these reasons, the court could find nothing in the statute to suggest that the section should not apply53to an aircraft lease from an old debtor to a new entity.
III.

CONTINENTAL'S SHORT TAKEOFF FROM
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

The body of creditors who had enjoyed the protection
of section 1110 and its ancestors took comfort in the Braniff I decision, presuming little could happen to endanger
their interests. They were in for a rude awakening.
In a decision that stunned the air finance industry,
Bankruptcy Judge Helen S. Balick ruled that the special
protections available to aircraft lessors under the Bankruptcy Code do not apply where the transaction in question is a sale-leaseback of aircraft or related equipment.5 4
In Continental I, the bankruptcy court concluded that
when sale-leaseback transactions do not finance the carrier's acquisition of new aircraft or equipment, section
1110 does not apply.55
The question before the bankruptcy court was whether
a sale-leaseback is the type of transaction entered into by
a "lessor" as defined in section I 110. This issue was resolved by examining the other two specially treated creditors: an entity holding a PMESI and a conditional vendor
56
that sold but did not retain title to the equipment.
m'Id. at 985.
52

Id.

5

d.

51In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 123 B.R. 713, 713 (Bankr. D. Del.), rev'd, 125
B.R. 399 (D. Del), afd, 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Continental I].
55

Id.

-' Id. See also Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. (In re
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Judge Balick found
no basis to conclude that the term "lessor" should be construed more broadly than the related terms of PMESI and
conditional vendor. By that [she meant] the sale-leaseback
transaction must be an acquisition transaction, which is
the kind of transaction embodied in the terms "PMESI"
and "conditional vendors" and not a transaction that
smacks of a general mortgage.57
The Continental I court offered this illustration of what it
believed to constitute an "acquisition" transaction specially protected by the statute: if a carrier arranges to buy
new aircraft from a manufacturer and, at the same time,
enters into a sale-leaseback of the same property with a
financing entity, such arrangement constitutes the kind of
sale-leaseback transaction that the term "lessor" includes.58 If there was not an inclusive deal, however, section 1110's protection would not be triggered.5 9 Critical
to the bankruptcy court was that the sale-leaseback must
involve new aircraft in order to qualify for protection
under section 11 10.60
The Delaware bankruptcy court further noted that section 1110's predecessor under the former Bankruptcy Act
likewise emphasized greater protection for transactions financing the acquisition of new equipment by airlines. 6 '
Unfortunately, the bankruptcy court's one page opinion is
remarkable for its lack of in-depth analysis both of the
modern law's predecessors and their collective legislative
history.
As could be expected, the leasing industry was outraged
over Continental I and "vociferously appealed" Judge
Continental Airlines Corp.), 57 B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) ("The
[Ijegislative [h]istory of the Bankruptcy Code requires Section 1110 to be narrowly construed.").
57 Continental 1, 123 B.R. at 713. See also Goldman et al., supra note 9, at 53
(generally secured lenders are not within section 1110's protection).
58 See Continental 1, 123 B.R. at 713.
59 See id.

Id.
61Id. See Bankruptcy Act § 116(5), 11 U.S.C. § 516(5)(repealed 1976).
60
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Balick's decision, contending that the ruling had completely misconstrued section 1110.62 ContinentalI, decried
the critics, fostered the debtor's reorganization at the expense of lessors and lenders who had relied upon the special protections of the Bankruptcy Code.6" Ironically,
during the 1980's airline deregulation boom, a short supply of new planes incited lessors to purchase and lease
back older aircraft to the airlines. Continental was a major
beneficiary of that trend. 64 Yet the debtor airline, in effect, turned on its benefactors by evading its section 1110
obligations to the aircraft lessors. To be sure, Continental I
proved to be but the opening gambit in a full-scale war to
be waged on several judicial fronts.
IV.

PAN AM - LESSORS TAKE FLIGHT

There was no doubt that the insurgent debtor airlines
were emboldened by the quick and stunning victory
awarded them by the bankruptcy judge in Continental I.
Even while that reorganizing carrier was steeling itself for
the massive counter-attack already in progress on the appellate battleground, a second front was being opened by
debtor airline Pan American. This troubled entity decided to go on the offensive in the bankruptcy court in
New York, relying on the Continental I decision as its key
strategic weapon. But this time, as history now tells us,
the outcome was very different for the debtor.
On April 2, 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied an appeal by Pan Am seeking to exempt
certain sale-leaseback transactions from the operation of
section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 5 When the
62

Mark Ivey and Michael Oneal, Continental, Writing The Book On Chapter 11, Bus.
18, 1991, at 335.

WK., Mar.
63 Id.

6 Kevin Kelly and Michael Oneal, All the Trouble Isn't In the Sky, Bus. WK., Mar.
11, 1991, at 84.
65 Section 1110 Parties v. Pan American Corp. (In re Pan American Corp.), 929
F.2d 109, 109 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2248 (1991).
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Supreme Court refused to stay the tribunal's ruling, 66 it
was all over except for a formal cease-fire. As the Second
Circuit did in its affirmance of the courts below, 67 this article will look to the erudite opinion of District Judge
Michael Mukasey in In re Pan Am Corp.,68 in which he up69
held the bankruptcy court's decision below.
The sole issue before Judge Mukasey was whether section I 110 of the Bankruptcy Code includes in its protections "those lessors that acquired such status in 'nonacquisition sale/leaseback transactions.' ",70 The debtor
alleged that Congress intended the statute to apply only
in circumstances in which the lessor leases aircraft and related equipment that are new to the airline.7 ' Pan Am
desperately needed a negative response to that allegation
if it were to avoid the burden of curing some $33 million
in aircraft lease defaults, both prepetition and
postpetition.
The dispute appeared to present a problem of statutory
interpretation and the court immediately set forth its reliance on the "plain meaning" rule.72 Finding that its own
appellate court had previously ruled that section 1110 is
unambiguous on its face,' 3 the district court agreed and
66Justice Rejects Delay Sought By Pan Am On Lease Payments, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8,
1991, at A5.
61 Section 1110 Parties, 929 F.2d at 109-110.
- 125 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Pan Am 1].
69 Therefore, the focus here shall not be on Bankruptcy Judge Cornelius Blackshear's initial decision in favor of the lessors, notwithstanding its succinct analysis.
See In re Pan Am Corp., 124 B.R. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
7' Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. at 373. In the decision below, the bankruptcy court issued
a decretal order that held that nonacquisition sale/leaseback transactions were
not disqualified from section 1110 protections merely because they were sale/
leasebacks without the acquisition element. Agreeing to decide the debtor airline's appeal therefrom on an expedited basis, Judge Mukasey limited his opinion
to this controversy. Id.
7' The debtor conceded that § 1110 included the "acquisition of any equipment
new to the airline, even used equipment." Id. at 374.
72 Id. at 374. See also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
240-42 (1989) (The "plain language" of the Bankruptcy Code "should be conclusive," and "there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain
language of a statute" contained therein.)
71 Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. at 374 (quoting California Chieftan v. Air Vermont, Inc.,
761 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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then added that the lease terminology contained in the
provision was "not modified in any way which suggested
that the statute was not meant to apply to lessors in a saleleaseback transaction.... [C]ourts should not impose the
additional requirement that the lease also involve equipment new to the airline," as argued by Pan Am. 74 Concurring with the Brani I decision,75 Judge Mukasey refused
to edit section 1110.76
Buttressed by the holding in BraniffI, the district court
moved on to analyze the relevant legislative history. 77
Tracing the evolution of the present day section 1110,
Judge Mukasey noted that Congress evinced a consistent
desire to encourage "low cost financing of the airline industry."78 Indeed, since the 1957 enactment of section
116(5) of the former Bankruptcy Act,7 9 while Congress
may have set out to encourage airlines to acquire new aircraft, it has effectuated that goal by the more general
method of increasing the availability of working capital
and decreasing its cost to the carrier. In no way could
that aim be construed as contrary to "the broad language
which Congress chose to use" in section 1110 and its
forebears.80
The court pointedly remarked that the Act's record
"fail[ed] to show with any clarity that Congress also intended to add an acquisition element to lease transac74

Id. at

374-75.

75 BraniffI,
76

110 B.R. 980, 983 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).

Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. 63, at 375.

77 Judge Mukasey noted that the "plain meaning" rule is not to be applied
mechanically. "Rather, courts may and should examine legislative history to determine a statute's purpose and then apply that purpose, if the plain meaning
produces an 'unreasonable' result 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation.'" Id. at 374 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.
534, 543-44 (1990)). Yet, the court cautioned, a rewriting of that same statute
"merely because the court disagrees with the manner Congress chose to further
its policy" would be improper. Pan Am I, 125 B.R. at 374. See Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 376 (1986).
78 Pan Am I, 125 B.R. at 376.
79Bankruptcy Act § 116(5), formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (repealed
1976).
80 Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. at 375. See GATX Leasing Corp. v. Airlift Int'l, Inc. (In re
Airlift Int'l Inc.), 761 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985).
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tions" protected by the statute. 8 ' To the contrary, the
legislative history demonstrated only that Congress refused to include general mortgage interests within section
1110.82 Such clarity of the lawmakers' vision is aptly
shown by how they limited the statute's protection to secured creditors with PMESI's. "There [are] no such statutory restrictions on lease transactions within [section]
1110," noted Judge Mukasey.83
This determination led Judge Mukasey to conclude
that, "[i]f anything, the legislative history of [section]
I 110 suggests that the Congressional omission of an acquisition element in lease transactions under [section
1110] was intentional. '84 In support of its position, the
court looked to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
general lease assumption/rejection statute, as proof that
Congress would "distinguish
among categories of lessors
85
when it so desired.9
The court also rejected Pan Am's argument that, because the statute only protected creditors' security interests arising from aircraft acquisitions, it implicitly limited
the protections given leases in the same manner. Judge
Mukasey found the argument illogical and contrary to the
rules of statutory construction.86 He felt that "the logical
conclusion [was] that Congress actually did not intend so
to restrict the class of protected lessors. ' '8 7 Therefore,
the acquisition element "explicitly imposed" upon secured creditors of an airline does not imply a similar pre81Pan Am I, 125 B.R. at 376.
82

Id.

83 Id.

84 Id. at 377.
85 Id. See Anthony M. Sabino & Mary Jane C. Sabino, Restoring The Necessity of
Timely Court Approval for The Assumption or Reection of Unexpired Leases Under Bankruptcy Code Section 365(d)(4), 27 DuQ. L. REV. 35, 42 (1988) (cited by In re Windmill
Farms Management Corp., 116 B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990)).
86 Pam Am I, 125 B.R. at 377.
87 Id. Traditionally, leases arising out of sale/leasebacks are analyzed in the
same manner as ordinary leases. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561, 581 (1978) (entitlement of lessor to deduct depreciation for federal tax
purposes).
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requisite for lessors.8 8
Moreover, the court felt the debtor's hair-splitting distinctions would only precipitate additional litigation as to
the scope of section 11 10 safeguards.8 9 If he accepted
Pan Am's view, Judge Mukasey envisioned disputes over
whether section 1110 protected "lessors of brand new
equipment, lessors of equipment new to the debtor airline, lessors of equipment new to the debtor airline and
also new to any predecessor of the debtor airline, or some
other category. ' 9°
Recognizing that the legislative history of the instant
law reflected many seemingly different but actually consistent goals, the district judge stated that courts should be
reluctant to rewrite the words of a statute unless the plain
meaning of those words leads to a result clearly contrary
to Congress' expressed intention. 9 ' "Otherwise, the benefit sought to be achieved by a statute like section I I 10the prospect of a quick and predictable remedy that encourages potential financiers to be forthcoming - will be
lost in a miasma of potential litigation.

'9 2

The court then

noted that inclusion of all lessors within section 11 10 "is
directly consistent with Congress' stated policy of increasing capital availability at the lowest possible cost" and
with the lawmakers' ultimate goal of fostering airline fleet
modernization.93
Taking a markedly pragmatic approach, Judge Mukasey
also noted that a sale-leaseback benefits the lessor with
available tax deductions and with the "future return on
the aircraft's residual value after expiration of the
lease."'9 4 Additionally, the sale-leaseback has the dual
88 Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. at 377.

89 Id.
- Id. at 378 (footnote omitted).
91 Id.

9 Id. Parenthetically, Judge Mukasey quoted Justice Frankfurter's comment
that "this is a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said,
when the legislative history is doubtful, go the statute." Id. at 378 (quoting
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956)).
93 Id. at 378-79.
-' Id. at 379.
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benefit of permitting the airline to tap its "least expensive
source of capital - its own" while retaining use of existing
equipment until new equipment is in place to begin service. 95 While complex sale-leasebacks of the type Pan Am
engaged in "may not have been directly contemplated" by
the drafters of section 1110 or its predecessors, Judge
Mukasey did find that "Congress was certainly familiar
with sophisticated leveraged lease transactions. "96
For these reasons, the sale-leaseback lessor was considered the airline's cheapest source of capital for financing
fleet modernization. 97 The court found such sound results worthy of encouragement by means of section
11 10's special remedies, especially since these results are
consistent with Congress' ultimate goal of encouraging air
carriers to upgrade their inventory of aircraft. 98 In conclusion, the district court found that neither the law's language nor its history indicated any legislative intent to
exclude aircraft sale-leaseback transactions from the purview of section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code.99 By so
finding, the court declared victory for the lessors and
made clear that section 1110 was sufficiently plain in both
its words and its history to encompass within its special
protections the sale-leaseback transactions at issue here.
Given this position, the Pan Am I court "respectfully disagree[d] with the analysis" of Bankruptcy Judge Balick in
Continental I.100
Pan Am I, therefore, marked the turning point for the
aircraft lessors, so recently on the defensive from ContinenI
Id.
Id. at 379 n.6. In addition, the courts have recognized sale-leasebacks for
over a century. Yorkshire Ry. Wagon Co. v. Maclure, 21 Ch. D. 309, 319 (1882)
(holding sale-leaseback of railroad locomotives treated as a bonafide transaction);
In re PCH Assocs., 804 F.2d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding sale-leasebacks are a
relatively modem, and clever, structure of financing); Sun Oil Co. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 562 F.2d 258, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding sale-leasebacks
"play a useful and accepted role in our economy").
"I Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. at 379.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 380.
96

100 Id.
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tal I. The decisive holding of Judge Mukasey was a crippling blow, not only to Pan Am but to other reorganizing
air carriers as well. Indeed, while the appellate confirmations were a coup de grace to an already beaten Pan Am, it
was the "breakout" that led to the subsequent defeat of
Continental, the airline that started it all.
V.

CONTINENTAL REVERSED - APPELLATE
COURTS GROUND THE AIRLINE

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSAL

The lessors had waged a successful campaign on the
second front in Pan Am I. However, the time had come
for an assault on Continental I. During the creditor's appeal from the ContinentalI decision,' 0 ' Continental moved
for authority to cure defaults on transactions, including
acquisition leases, for which necessary payments totalled
nearly $108 million. The debtor airline asserted that
since non-acquisition leases did not fall within the purview of section 1110, it could continue to use aircraft acquired via sale-leasebacks without making the payments
then due of approximately $58 million. Five airlines, including American West Airlines, American Airlines,
Northwest Airlines, United Air Lines, and USAir, and the
American Association of Equipment Lessors filed a brief
in support of the creditors' appeal. These solvent airlines
took the position that "putting off required payments
would discourage lessors from entering into sale-leaseback transactions and thus would make it tougher for airlines to raise badly needed capital."' 0 2 District Judge
Robert S. Gawthrop, III, of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation, found that the "substantive issue before the
court [was] solely one of statutory construction: whether
the terms 'lessor' and 'lease' in section 1110 cover lessors
who purchase from an airline the very aircraft or aircraft
10 In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 125 B.R. 399, 401 (Bankr. D. Del.
1991)[hereinafter Continental II].
102

Wade Lambert, U.S. Judge Rules Continental Airlines Must Pay Its Debts on Air-

craft Leases, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1991, at A5.
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equipment that they lease back to the airline." 1 3
For its first defense, the debtor argued that the bankruptcy court's order was not final and hence not ripe for
appeal. The district court quickly resolved that objection,
stating:
Section 1110 grants certain creditors the right to be free
from the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code. The
bankruptcy court's order in this case deprives appellants
of these rights forever. Although the lessors retain rights
in their property, these rights are fundamentally altered
when subjected to the operation of the bankruptcy code.
of a final decision. This court has jurisThis is the essence
0 4
diction thereby.
Judge Gawthorp then determined that the legal question
was whether the leases fell outside the protection of section 1110 because no new airplanes were brought into
Continental's fleet. 10 5 Acknowledging that both the Braniff and Pan Am I courts found that non-acquisition leases
were covered by section 1110 and that the opinions, while
denot on point, were "instructive," Judge Gawthorp
10 6
raised."'
issue
the
at
look
fresh
a
"take
to
cided
Continental invited this fresh look by invoking the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, literally, "that a thing may be
known by its associates."'' 0 7 The debtor urged that section 1110 included only acquisition leases. This position
was taken because the statute's associated terms of conditional seller and secured holder of a purchase money
equipment security interest afortiori entailed acquisitions
"designed08 to augment a carrier's fleet and equipment
'
supply."'
To the dismay of the debtor airline, the court held that
noscitur a sociis did not apply in this context. 09 The court
Continental 11, 125 B.R. at 402.
Id.
1-5 Id. at 403.
103

104

106

Id.

107

Id.

108 Id.
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found that "[m]axims of statutory construction are aids in
ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, not tools to
contradict plain meaning." 0 The district court held that
a word is not necessarily intended "to be treated like its
fellows in all respects" simply because the lawmakers
place it within a statutory list."' Moreover, the noscitur
doctrine applied only where the meaning of a term was in
doubt, a factor not present in the case at bar." 2
Finding no ambiguity in the word "lease" as used in
section 1110, the court acknowledged that while a "lease"
may arise in a variety of contexts, sale-leaseback leases are
generally considered leases within this context.' 13 "The
fact that an airline sells a lessor an aircraft, before entering an agreement to lease the same aircraft back from the
lessor, does not mean that the agreement is not a 'lease,'
as the term is commonly understood."' " 4 In extinguishing the debtor's spin on the noscitur canon, Judge Gawthrop held:
Continental points to no ambiguity inherent to the term
"lease" as used in section 1110. Rather, Continental suggests that the meaning of lease must be restricted to avoid
a clash with the meaning of the other two terms in the list.
However, the fact that lease transactions need not involve
new acquisitions, while conditional sales or PMESIs necessarily involve acquisitions, does not mean that the three
terms were not intended to have their full and ordinary
meaning. Indeed, absent clear indication to the contrary,
the plain meaning of the terms controls.'
The court rejected the airline's public policy argument
that a restrictive reading of section 1110 furthered the ultimate goal of reorganization. In reviewing this question,
Judge Gawthrop stated:
The policy question here concerns the trade-off of pre110

Id.

III Id.

Id. at 403-04.
at 404.
114 Id.
115 Id.
112

113Id.
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bankruptcy benefits for post-bankruptcy burdens. If saleleasebacks are afforded [section] 1110 protection, solvent
airlines are benefitted with a means to obtain inexpensive
financing, enabling them to upgrade operations and stave
off insolvency during a credit crunch. At the same time, if
the airline goes into bankruptcy, it will be faced with the
obligation of having to make payments on the sale-leaseback leases if it wishes to keep operating the aircraft held
under these leases. The national economic implications of
this dynamic, while subject to debate, are not so clearly
undesirable to require that [section] 1110 be read contrary
to its literal terms.' 16
The Continental II bench concluded there was nothing on
the face of the statute which suggested that the term
"lease"
carried anything other than its ordinary
17
'
meaning.
As did its predecessors, the court looked to the legislative history of section 1110, even though the, statute was
plain on its face. The district judge set the tone of this
portion of his analysis by forewarning that a party attacking "plain meaning" faced a heavy burden of demonstrating that a literal reading of the law "is demonstrably at
odds with the legislative intent." '" 8 Following an analysis
of section 1110 and its antecedents, the court found that
Congress had preserved a special set of protections for
lessors in section 1110 "in apparent acquiescence to the
financing industry's 'addiction' to equipment trust financing."" '9 Consequently, Continental read "[c]ongressional
intent to include only acquisition financing in the exemption, and to exclude lease transactions that do not bring
new equipment to an airline, but which are used instead
' 20
to bring in operating capital."'
While conceding that Congress aimed to encourage
11, Id. at 406.

Id.
Id. Judge Gawthorp felt that this perforce limits the court's inquiry into the
lawmakers' intent.
111Id. at 410.
120 Id.
117
"1
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carriers to acquire new aircraft, Judge Gawthrop was unable to find that Congress meant to restrict the statute to
only acquisition financing, as contrasted with saleleasebacks.' 2 ' Thejudge found that the legislative history
also contained "various remarks regarding the encouragement of financing in general," especially less expensive
forms of financing. 122 References to the exclusion of general mortgages from the benefits of section 1 110 were not
relevant, the court stated, because "a mortgage is not a
lease."'' 23 Moreover, the court signaled its agreement
with Pan Am I, stating that "[w]hile non-acquisition leases
do not directly result in new aircraft or equipment for a
carrier, the conversion of ownership interests in existing
aircraft to leasehold interests, frees up capital that an airline can use to facilitate the acquisition of such aircraft."' 24 The district court also acknowledged that
section I 110 may seem to work at cross-purposes with the
automatic stay, for as section 1110 is interpreted more
broadly, the debtor's estate protected from reorganization is diminished in equal measure. 125 The court, however, found this circumstance to be mitigated by the fact
and shipping inthat section 1110 applies only to airline
26
dustry reorganization proceedings.
Judge Gawthrop concluded:
Congress certainly knew that the inclusion of equipment
leases within section 1110 would limit the resources available for airlines during reorganization. That Congress
nevertheless failed to restrict the type of leases exempted,
and failed to suggest a need for such restriction in legislative reports,
is evidence that Congress meant what it
said.']27
Judge Gawthorp further noted that "there are numerous
Id.
Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 410-11.
2 Id. at 411.
127 Id.
121
122
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ways Congress could have written section 1110 in order
to further its apparent goal. However, the judicial task is
to give effect to what Congress actually did."'

28

Judge

Gawthrop gave Congress the benefit of the doubt as to
their level of sophistication, commenting in an aside that:
Congress's [sic] knowledge of the use of sale-leaseback
transactions in the transportation industries is not certain.
Sale-leaseback transactions, however, are not new to the
financing industry. That sale-leaseback transactions were
used in and prior to 1978, and Congress did not act to
exclude them from the coverage of section 1110, is29evidence that Congress intended them to be included.'
For these reasons, the district court was compelled to reverse the bankruptcy court and find that non-acquisition
leases are covered by section 1110.130

B.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT AFFIRMS FOR THE LESSORS

The sale-leaseback controversy plateaued when the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confirmed in In re
Continental Airlines, Inc. that such transactions fall within
the exceptional remedies of section 1110. 3' t There the

circuit tribunal was unanimous in affirming District Judge
Gawthrop's decision. Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge
Scirica declared that "[t]his case turns exclusively on the
s
After resolving the
interpretation of [section] 1110. ' 132

procedural question of finality for appellate jurisdiction,
the court turned to the merits of the controversy.
The parties made essentially the same arguments that
were put forth in the district court. The debtor contended that the lessors could not avail themselves of section 1110 because sale-leasebacks did not come under the
purview of the statute. Continental argued that section
1110 "was intended to apply only to leases which result in
128

Id. (footnote omitted).

129

Id. at 411 n.12 (citations omitted).

130Id. at 411.
'.'
1.12

932 F.2d 282, 294 (3d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Continental III].
Id. at 284.
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aircraft that are new to an airline's fleet," thereby excluding sale-leasebacks.' 33 The lessors countered by asserting
that the statute "plainly refers to any lease, whether acqui' 34
sition or non-acquisition.'
The tribunal stated that its task was to determine
"whether the word 'lease' in [section] 1 110 was intended
to apply only to acquisition leases.' 35 From the outset,
the court stipulated that it was not writing on "a blank
slate." ' 3 6 The very question presented here was considered in both Pan Am I and Braniff, where similar arguments made by the airlines were defeated. Using the
earlier decisions as a guide, the Third Circuit
reached the
37
lessors.
the
for
found
and
result
same
As did the other tribunals, the court began with the
plain meaning of section 1110, forewarning that "when
the statutory language speaks clearly, a party seeking to
counter that language must produce other evidence that
exhibits at least as much clarity."'' 38 On its face, section
1110 "permits a 'lessor of aircraft that are leased to a
debtor that is an air carrier' to repossess those aircraft,
39
notwithstanding the automatic stay."1
The airline put forth the remarkable contention that
"Congress neglected to insert qualifying language that
would have explicitly limited the application of section
11 10 to acquisition leases."'' 40 The court noted that "accepting this argument would require us to qualify the
plain meaning of the statute's words," something the tribunal could do only if an application of section 1 110's
plain meaning would yield results "demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of the law's drafters."' 4 ' Without hesi133

Id. at 285.

134

Id.

135 Id.
136

137
138

Id. at 287.

Id.
Id.

139

Id. at 284.

140

Id. at 288.

141 Id.
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tation, the Third Circuit rejected Continental's argument.
Like the district court below, this panel refused to apply
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis and thereby look to the
PMESI and conditional vendor terms within section 1110
"to qualify language that Congress has left unqualified" in
the Bankruptcy Code. 42 The panel held that a party seeking to avoid the clear meaning of a statute has the burden
of demonstrating an alternative interpretation with at
least equivalent clarity.143 Noscitur a sociis was found inapplicable "in light of the statue's plain language and evidence indicating that Congress did not necessarily intend
for the term 'lease' to be qualified."' 44 The tribunal
found its position supported by the legislative evolution
of the statute:
The legislative history of [section] 1110 and the policy
concerns upon which it was based do not support the application of noscitur a sociis. We do not discern a clear expression of Congressional intent to limit section 1110 to
acquisition financing, nor do we foresee patently illogical
45
consequences arising from a contrary interpretation.1
The Third Circuit then turned fully to the legislative
history of section 1 110 for its analysis of the purposes behind the modern law and its predecessors. Acknowledging that a goal of section 1110 was to facilitate the airlines'
acquisition of new aircraft and equipment, Judge Scirica
felt that this was not Congress' sole aim.' 46 Rather, the
legislative record demonstrates an intent to aid airlines in
procuring low cost capital and shows that Congress intended sale-leaseback transactions to be included in the
definition of lease.' 47 Any other conclusion "would recognize arbitrary distinctions among otherwise similar
lease transactions, and create further uncertainties in the
142

Id.

143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at

289.

146Id. at 291.
147

Id.
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Writing for the panel,

Judge Scirica elaborated by stating:
We recognize that the legislative history of [section] 1110
and each of its predecessors expresses a desire to help the
affected industries modernize their fleets. However, increasing the general availability of capital is a means of accomplishing that end. .

.

. Sale-leasebacks are a major

form of financing in the airline industry. Several solvent
airlines, supporting the lessors as Amid, maintain that denying [section] I 110 protection to sale-leasebacks would
severely curtail financing prospects for the entire industry.
We believe providing protection to this form of lease financing is consistent with the legislative history of section
1110.149

Moreover, the prohibition against section 1110 protections for general mortgages was not designed to qualify
the word "lease." 150 Congress' distinction between leases
and security interests in the legislative history also contra15 1
dicted any reliance upon the noscitur doctrine.
The Third Circuit also spoke convincingly of the reality
of the section 1110 dilemma:
We believe that following the plain language of the statute
is especially important in this case, where Congress intended that commercial operators rely on [section] 11 10
in structuring long-term deals involving costly assets. We
agree that ('[o]therwise, the benefit sought to be achieved
by a statute like [section] 1110 - the prospect of a quick
and predictable remedy that encourages potential financiers to be forthcoming - will be lost in a miasma of potential litigation.') Section 1110 was intended to facilitate the
procurement of low-cost capital by providing an advantage in bankruptcy to holders of certain interests. If the
application of [section] 1110 is not predictable, potential
lessors may require additional payments to compensate
for this risk of uncertainty. If Congress intends to alter
148 Id.
149 id.

at 291-92.
uso Id. at 292.
151

Id. at 292-93.
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52
the incentives of [section] 1110, it must do so clearly.'
The Third Circuit concluded that "[e]ncouraging acquisition of new equipment was certainly one aim of [section]
1 110. But . . .there are many ways in which [section]
1110 could be rewritten to reflect various goals alluded to
in the legislative history."' 5 3 Without a stronger showing
of a contrary legislative intent, the court was compelled to
follow the plain language of section 1110, leaving it to the
54
lawmakers to qualify the chosen words on another day.'
In a further blow to the debtor airline, the Third Circuit
subsequently retracted any language in its original opinion suggesting that the debtor's leased aircraft could not
be repossessed until the bankruptcy court determined
whether the leases were true leases or disguised security
interests. Apparently, some parties had construed the
panel's discussion of the true lease versus disguised security interest dichotomy as meaning that "the lessors would
have to wait for a bankruptcy court determination that the
leases were true leases before beginning repossession." 55
In a "novel motion for clarification" made to the circuit
court, the lessors argued that such delay would eviscerate
their rights under section 1110.156 Within weeks of issuing its original opinion, the Third Circuit declared that
nothing in its opinion should be construed as limiting the
rights of any lessor to repossess its aircraft or that the
any given lease was an issue to be degenuine nature of157
remand.
on
cided
Id. at 293-94 (quoting Pan Am 1, 125 B.R. 372, 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
Id. at 294.
154 Id.
52

'1

151Continental Airlines May Lose Its Planes, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS &
COMMENT, July 4, 1991, at A2.
15 Id.
157

Id.
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"BY ANY OTHER NAME" - "POOLING/
INTERCHANGE" LEASES AND
SECTION 1110

We have seen how recent court decisions upheld the
special protections of section 1110 to lessors in aircraft
sale-leaseback transactions. Yet the statute covers a
broader spectrum than just aircraft leases. Indeed, the
next case addresses the unique protections that section
1110 affords those creditors who deal with airlines, not
only for the airplanes themselves as collateral but also for
a host of related and specialized equipment. These parties also derive great benefit from the Bankruptcy Code by
reason of the critical nature of the business they transact.
In In re Pan Am Corp.,"" District Judge Michael B.
Mukasey ruled that the debtor airline's right to return
similar, but not identical, equipment to a lessor does not
change the bona fide nature of the lease, nor does it diminish the protections available to the lessor pursuant to
section 11 10 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 5 9 In this case, the
court once again advocated a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code and, moreover, awarded yet another victory
to the leasing community as to its entitlement to the specific protections embodied in the bankruptcy laws. District Judge Mukasey explicitly held that courts must follow
the plain meaning of section 1110 in allocating that statute's special protections to lessors. 60 The district court
was asked once more to review the ruling below' 6 ' of
Bankruptcy Judge Blackshear. The district court focused
now on the portion of the Article I court's decision and
order that leases providing for the pooling or interchange
of aircraft equipment could not, ipso facto, be denied the
protections of the statute. The bankruptcy court made
this ruling over the objections of the unsecured creditors'
committee of Pan Am, who then brought an instant
,-51 130 B.R. 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Pan Am II].
Id. at 411.
', Id. at 412.
161

In re Pan Am Corp., 124 B.R. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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162

Judge Mukasey framed the issue before him as
whether a transaction, in which the lessor undertakes to
"lease" equipment to the debtor, automatically falls
outside the protection of [section 1110] because the
debtor has the option of returning similar equipment of
similar value and utility to the lessor at the end of the lease
term instead of the particular piece of equipment originally leased. 63
He then described the nature of the disputed transactions
in the following manner:
First are transactions in which lessors provide only aircraft
engines, and not airframes. Second are transactions in
which lessors provide both engines and airframes - i.e.
complete, usable aircraft. The Committee argues that
neither transaction is protected by [section] 1110 because
both permit Pan Am to move "leased" engines freely from
airframe to airframe during the "lease" term, and to return
engines at the end of the term other than the particular
engines originally provided."6
The court described these transactions as "pooling/interchange" leases. 165 Pan Am's unsecured creditors argued that, because the airline had the option of returning
similar equipment instead of original equipment to its lessors, these leases fell outside the coverage of section
1110.
In his analysis, Judge Mukasey referred to his "plain
meaning" doctrine for section 1110, a view affirmed by
the Second Circuit and strongly advocated by the Third
Circuit in the Continental III bankruptcy. 166 In short, the
district judge adhered to the view that section 1110
clearly encompassed any true lease of aircraft or aircraft
1 67
equipment.
162
163

Pan Am 11, 130 B.R. at 411.
Id.

64 Id.

Id.
,,; Id. See Continental 111, 932 F.2d at 287-89.
16 Pan Am 1I, 130 B.R. at 413.
165
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Taking the opportunity to reaffirm his earlier holding,
Judge Mukasey utilized his own precedent in the instant
controversy.
I declined [in Pan Am I] to read into [section] 1110 the
unstated requirement that a lease involve the acquisition
of equipment new to the airline. That same reasoning applies to the Committee's argument that, with respect to
leases, [section] 1110 contains an unstated requirement
that the lease provide for the return of the original equipment at the end of the term. The statute does not contain
that requirement and I decline to add an additional condition by judicial fiat. Nor does the statute contain any such
requirement with respect to the other kinds of transactions protected by [section] 1110 - purchase money
equip168
ment security transactions or conditional sales.
In this way, District Judge Mukasey held that, to the extent a party is a true lessor, an option for the lessee airline
to return similar, but not identical, equipment does not
69
nullify the statute's safeguards.
The court also refuted the notion that equipment leases
containing pooling/interchange clauses are inconsistent
with the concept of a true lease. Admitting that a true
lease ordinarily calls for the return of exactly the same
equipment, Judge Mukasey nevertheless found no basis
for the argument that a lease must provide for the return
of the original leased property.17 0 The court cited the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in support of its conclusion. 17 1 Characterizing the right of the debtor to substitute similar equipment at lease-end as essentially a
purchase option, the court noted the UCC states that the
inclusion of a purchase option does not automatically
72
convert a lease into a security agreement.
Id. at 412 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 413.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 413-14 (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978)).
172 Id. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978).
The official text of§ 1-201(37) provides
that "[a] transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides
that.., the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the
goods." Id.
166

69
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Judge Mukasey also observed that a true lease, as opposed to a disguised security interest, is heavily dependent upon individual facts. 173 While a pooling/
interchange option is relevant to such determination, especially if the debtor could substitute virtually worthless
equipment for valuable equipment, each case is nevertheless sui generis.174 The court found that this case "concerns
the strictly legal question of whether the presence of a
pooling/interchange provision automatically takes' 17a
transaction outside the protection of [section] 11 10. 5
Additionally, the court noted that the bankruptcy court
specifically made no factual determination of any particular lease as a true lease or otherwise. 1 76 Judge Mukasey
found that the bankruptcy judge gave the "sensible advice" that lessors may repossess, but at their own risk, and
that any doubtful arrangements should be brought before
the lower tribunal for a declaratory judgment to resolve
that point.177 For these reasons, Judge Mukasey confirmed the findings of Bankruptcy Judge Blackshear and
concluded that a bankrupt lessee's right to substitute
equipment at lease-end did not automatically deny the
lessor the special protections of section 1110.178
The court also confirmed that a lessor seeking to exercise its exceptional powers of repossession pursuant to
section 1110 could proceed outside the bankruptcy forum. The unsecured creditors' committee requested an
order from the bankruptcy judge directing lessors seeking
to repossess under section 1110 to direct its claim to the
bankruptcy court. The committee argued that, unless all
such actions occurred in the bankruptcy court, chaos
would ensue.
Treating Bankruptcy Judge Blackshear's refusal to issue
such an order as a refusal to grant a preliminary injuncPan Am 11, 130 B.R. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 414 n.4.
17.1
171Id. at 414.
173
174

177 Id.

178Id.
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tion, the district judge noted that the legal standard for
such relief is left to the lower court's discretion, a discretion not ordinarily disturbed on appeal." 9 The district
court found that the issue was not whether the bankruptcy
court could compel parties seeking to repossess under
section 1110 into the Article I forum, but whether the
bankruptcy judge abused his discretion in refusing to issue such an order. 80 The court reasoned:
Considering that [section] 1110 explicitly states that the
right of a lessor to repossess equipment "is not affected by
section 362 or 363 of this title or by any power of the court to

enjoin such taking of possession," it is unclear whether
Judge Blackshear even had the power to issue the type of
general order covering all challenged transactions which
the Committee claims he was required to issue.' 8 '
In short, Judge Makasey rejected the airline's position. 8 2
If Pan Am believed a lessor was acting wrongfully in seeking repossession outside the bankruptcy forum, it could
seek an injunction from the bankruptcy court. 8 3 Thus,
Judge Mukasey left this segment of the bankruptcy court's
84
order unaltered.

By its recognition of pooling/interchange provisions as
permissible clauses in a "true lease," the court relieved
the leasing community of the concern that such transactions will subsequently be deemed disguised security interests. 8 5 The court also upheld the rights of aircraft
lessors to seek the non-bankruptcy remedy of repossession, a privilege such lessors presumed section 1110 accorded to them. 8 6 Once again, the special protections
allotted to aircraft lessors by the statute were recognized
179 Id.
'so Id.

at 415.

1 I8
ld. (emphasis added).
182 Id. at 415-16.
183 Id.
- Id. at 416.
185 See
186 Id.

id.
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and upheld. Another crucial battle was thus won by the
creditors.
VII.

RETURN OF LEASED AIRCRAFT TO
TRUSTEE

Aircraft sale-leasebacks were also the subject of controversy in the then near-bankruptcy of Trans World Airlines
(TWA). In Connecticut National Bank v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. (CNB), a federal district court vindicated the right of
an equipment trustee to the return of its aircraft collateral. 87 The opinion issued in CNB dealt directly with the
respective rights of debtors and trustees in such equip88
ment lease transactions.1
The facts of the case were uncontroverted. Connecticut
National Bank (CNB) was acting as the trustee pursuant to
an equipment trust agreement covering the sale and
leaseback to TWA of ten aircraft and over ninety jet engines. CNB was the owner of the property. TWA was required to pay principal and interest on secured notes
underlying the transaction directly to CNB. The bank
would in turn pay the individual noteholders who were
the beneficiaries of the equipment trust. Also, TWA had
both guaranteed payment to the beneficiaries and agreed
to indemnify CNB.
In early 1991, TWA failed to make a scheduled payment
of approximately $57 million on the notes. CNB then
filed the instant action, seeking specific performance in
the form of the return of the aircraft and the jet engines, a
remedy provided in the sale-leaseback agreement in case
of a default by TWA. TWA resisted this remedy, asserting
that it had not been afforded an opportunity for discovery
on the question of whether CNB was merely a "naked
trustee" acting as a mere conduit for a remedy flowing to
the trust beneficiaries and, thus, not the proper party to
bring suit. The court rejected the airline's position on the
762 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter CNB].
1" id. at 77.
187
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discovery issue." 9 The court found that there was there
was "absolutely no merit" to the argument that CNB was
a denuded trustee and that further discovery would not
alter that conclusion.19 0 Given that CNB owned the property in question, its standing to bring suit was clear. 19 1
In addition, the remedy CNB sought had been provided
for in the sale-leaseback agreement. 92 CNB was therefore the only party that could properly seek the return of
the chattels. Since the trust beneficiaries lacked such abilities, CNB would be violating its fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries by not seeking return of the aircraft and the
engines. The mere fact that some of these beneficiaries
had also sued TWA on its guarantee of payment in New
York state court did not prevent CNB from protecting its
ownership rights. 19
The airline's next argument was that specific performance was an inappropriate remedy in these circumstances.
Judge Goettel characterized the heart of this dispute as
94
whether or not CNB had an adequate remedy at law. '
The court stated that it did not view this lawsuit as one for
specific performance but rather as CNB seeking to enforce a contractual obligation owed by TWA to pay
money. 195 A demand for payment "would [have been] futile since TWA has already failed to pay."'' 96 Instead, CNB
sought "to have the property returned, which [was] the
97
precise remedy the parties previously agreed to.'
Given the contractual arrangement between the parties,
CNB was entitled to have its property returned.'
189

Id. at 79.

190 Id.
19, Id.

Id.
Id.
-9 Id. at 79-80. Additionally, TWA argued it would be inequitable to require
return of the property "in light of the tremendous ramifications such an order
might have on both TWA and the public at large." Id. at 80.
Id. at 80.
196 Id.
17 Id.
198 Id.
192

193
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Looking to the New York codification of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the court pointed out that the law permits a secured creditor to sue on the debt itself or foreclose on the underlying collateral. 99 The court felt it
would have been illogical for the rights of CNB as an
owner to be more limited than those of a secured
lender. °0 Making an analogy to the situation where
someone leases a car and then defaults on the required
payments, Judge Goettel found it would work an absurd
result if the lessor could not demand the return of the vehicle but instead was forced to secure a money judgment
against the lessee and then attempt to enforce it by levying on the very chattel it already owned. 20 1 "Such a result
would turn property law as we know it on its head," and
the court refused to apply such unsound reasoning to the
instant case. °2
The court went on to declare as "nothing short of specious" the claim by TWA that CNB would be adequately
protected by obtaining a money judgment. 0 TWA contended that CNB was not suffering any loss or risk since
the bank was only required to pay the beneficiaries what it
received from TWA, and since the airline was maintaining
the planes in accordance with strict FAA guidelines, the
property was not at risk.
Judge Goettel noted that TWA had "been teetering on
the brink of bankruptcy for years," and it was therefore
unlikely that the company possessed enough cash to satisfy a money judgment in any event.2 0 4 Indeed, the court
reasoned that if the airline had the money in the first
place, most likely it would never have defaulted on the
sale-leaseback agreement. Judge Goettel made the cogent observation that, if CNB were to obtain a money
judgment, logically it would then attach certain TWA
- Id. (citing N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 9-503 (McKinney 1964)).
CNB, 762 F. Supp. at 80.
201 See id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
2-

204

CNB, 652 F. Supp. at 80.
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property, such as the very planes and jet engines at issue. 20 5 Since "[t]his would return us precisely to the position we are in today," the court rejected that alternative as
grossly unfair to the bank in light of the fact that repossession was a remedy provided for in the contract.2 6 The
adequate safeguards that TWA was supposedly exercising
to preserve the property were found to be relevant because the property had always belonged to CNB, and the
bank had the right to demand its return. 0 7
TWA also argued that the balance of the equities demanded that the company be allowed to keep the aircraft.
Rejecting this argument, the court found it difficult to imagine "a more grievous wrong" than permitting the airline to continue to use the bank's property without paying
for it.20 8 Taking notice of news reports that TWA was selling certain of its international routes to another airline,
the court additionally found that these reports suggested
that "TWA possesse[d] more planes and engines than it
[would] actually need. ' 20 9 Implicitly, the return of the
property at issue to CNB would not damage a shrinking
TWA. No doubt, the fact that this lawsuit involved only
ten jets out of the entire TWA fleet of over 200 airliners
had some influence on the court. Additionally, TWA's
cause suffered because of its failure to clarify the actual
threat posed by repossession or any harmful effect that
the return of the engines at issue would cause.
The court also compared this action with an eviction
proceeding where the defaulting tenant argues that by being evicted he would experience a greater hardship than
the landlord who was simply losing money.210 Embracing
such an argument would produce "an illogical result"
under which a tenant could never be evicted. 21' "Just as a
205

Id.

2-

Id. at 80-81.

207
20
20q
210
211

Id. at 81.
CNB, 762 F. Supp. at 81.
Id.
Id.
CNB, 762 F. Supp. at 81.
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tenant can be evicted," held Judge Goettel, "a lessee of
property who fails to pay can be required to return the
21 2
property to the owner.9
In its final argument, TWA contended that the recent
Persian Gulf conflict, the public's fear of terrorism, and
sharply increased fuel prices had so curtailed its cash flow
that it was unable to make the payments due under the
agreement. While not doubting the severe financial distress encountered by, all airlines because of recent events
in the Middle East, the court nevertheless found that
"none of these factors excuse[d] TWA from its obligations. 21 3 First, said the court, the airline could have negotiated for a force majeure clause in the trust agreement,
but it did not.21 4 Secondly, all of the foregoing setbacks,
including the escalating price of foreign oil, "were clearly
foreseeable and simply represent the risk of doing business in an international forum. 21 5 Finally, the court felt
that TWA could not argue that "the threat of war in the
Middle East is something of which it was unaware. "216
Judge Goettel noted that "the people of that region have
been at war for thousands of years and recent history has
been no different. ' 21 7 The judge also cited the threat of
terrorism associated with this region and the fact that international airlines for years had factored the various regional instabilities into their fares. Since all of these risks
were foreseeable when the parties entered into the saleleaseback, TWA was not entitled to relief for failing to
meet its obligations. For all these reasons, the court
granted judgment for CNB.21 8
In analyzing the CNB decision, the lessor community
212
213
214

Id.
Id.
Id.

CNB, 762 F. Supp. at 81.
Id.
217 Id.
211 Id. As anticipated, TWA appealed and won a temporary stay ofJudge Goettel's order on the condition that it post a $20 million bond. The Court of Appeals
215
216

for the Second Circuit is now considering the matter. Today's News, N.Y. L.J., May

29, 1991, at 1.
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and equipment trustees can take some comfort in the rule
of law set forth by Judge Goettel. First, the court recognized the standing of the trustee to commence a lawsuit to
protect its interest. Beneficiaries under an equipment
trust agreement may rely upon the trustee to pursue appropriate remedies against a recalcitrant debtor. The
simple, but nevertheless critical, role of the trustee as the
true owner of the property was extremely important. This
case shows that in certain instances, it may be advisable to
have the trustee in an equipment sale-leaseback arrangement also be the owner of the property. Clearly, that was
an important factor for this court in reviewing the propriety of the trustee commencing this action.
The court's comments on the assumption of risk likewise bear notice. Both sides to future transactions should
now take a careful view of the relevant burdens each side
is expected to shoulder. Clearly, the judge held no sympathy for TWA when it claimed the Gulf War was an excuse for its non-performance. Foreseeability was
important on this point. An equipment lessee desiring
some protection in the event of financial setbacks is
clearly forewarned by CNB that such safeguards must be
built into the agreement. Conversely, the trustee and the
beneficiaries should carefully consider exactly how much
latitude they wish to afford to a lessee that may fall upon
hard times. If they choose to be generous now, they may
be foreclosed in the days ahead from seeking remedies
critical to the protection of their interests. In this context,
the careful drafting of the force majeure clause is vital.
In conclusion, CNB represents a timely opinion on the
subject of equipment sale-leasebacks and provides sound
guidance to lessees, trustees, and beneficiaries alike for
future transactions.
VIII. JUDGMENT DAY - TERMINATING
AIRCRAFT LEASES PRE-BANKRUPTCY
The previous discussion reviewed the struggle waged
between the debtor airlines and their creditors in the
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bankruptcy courts, primarily over the scope and impact of
section 1110. Of significance is the fact that all the disputes occurred after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
What would the result be if the lessor attempted to sever
ties to the airline before the commencement of insolvency
proceedings? To answer this question we must travel
southward again to sunny Florida and the Braniff bankruptcy, but, unlike before, this particular lessor was given
a chilly reception by the Orlando bankruptcy judge. 21 9
In Braniff, Inc. v. GPA Group PLC,220 the controversy involved the rights of the debtor airline to twenty-six new
Airbus A320 jets, including leaseholds. "The principal issue in dispute was whether Braniff's rights to the aircraft
were validly terminated prior to the September 28, 1989
filing by Braniff of a Chapter 11 petition. ' 22 ' Braniff filed
for reorganization at 1:35 a.m. on September 28, 1989.
Several hours before the filing, GPA, an aircraft lessor,
telecopied various notices to the debtor "purporting to
terminate Braniff s rights in and to the 26 aircraft," for
reason of alleged unspecified defaults in the agreements
concerning the acquisition of the aircraft.222 Specifically,
these termination notices were transmitted at approximately 9:00 p.m. on September 27, 1989, less than five
hours prior to the bankruptcy filing.
The critical transactions for the A320s were leveraged
leases known as a "Japanese Double Dip."
Pursuant to the Japanese Double Dip, each aircraft was
sold to a Japanese entity, which was, in turn entitled to
receive tax credits in Japan by reason of [its] ownership of
the aircraft. Additionally, through a complicated set of
transactions, [an indenture trustee] became the actual
owner of each A320 aircraft for United States tax
219

See BranifI, 110 B.R. at 985. See also supra notes 33-52 and accompanying

text.
220

I/].
221
222

In re Braniff, Inc., 118 B.R. 1819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)[hereinafter Braniff
Id. at 828.
Id. at 829.
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purposes.223
The trustee then entered into leases with GPA, and GPA
subleased the aircraft to Braniff. GPA now sought to terminate those leases.
Important to Bankruptcy Judge Corcoran was that GPA
had previously acquired the right to obtain a ten percent
stake in Braniff at a future date, that GPA had substantial
amounts of financial data concerning the airline, including
such information that made it abundantly clear that Braniff was in financial peril, and that "Braniff might consider
filing a petition under the Bankruptcy Code. ' 224 Moreover, the bankruptcy judge found that GPA's imprecise
claims that the debtor was in default of the agreements
prior to the commencement of the case were unsupported. 225 Braniff, the bankruptcy court found, was not in
default on its agreements with GPA, had been paying its
debts as they became due, and, in fact, was owed nearly
half a million dollars by GPA on a separate past due obligation.2 2 6 In short, concluded Judge Corcoran, in those
dark hours of September 27th, GPA attempted to terminate the leases solely on the belief that Braniff would file
2 27
for bankruptcy.
Of great concern to the court was the value of the aircraft to the debtor. Judge Corcoran found:
The A320 aircraft are extremely valuable assets to the estate. Although at the time of trial Braniff's plans for the
A320 aircraft had not been formulated, Braniff may use
the aircraft in future operations under a plan of reorganization or may attempt to transfer its rights to such aircraft
to obtain critical funds for its reorganization. Without the
aircraft, Braniff's ability to reorganize will be frustrated.
Contrary to GPA's contentions, Braniff has significant equity in the subleases. If Braniff loses its protected rights to
the twenty-six A320 aircraft with the earliest delivery posi22. Id. at 830.
224 Braniffl, 118
225
226
227

Id. at 842.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 836.

B.R. at 831, 835-36.
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228

By way of contrast, the needs of the lessor were slight.
The court found that GPA would not be prejudiced by allowing Braniff to proceed to a reorganization that included the twenty-six A320's, the lessor would be the
beneficiary of substantial tax credits if the leases were not
terminated, and GPA was adequately protected because
the aircraft had been well maintained and were not deteriorating in value.229
Turning to his legal conclusions, Judge Corcoran found
that, under the applicable state law, the GPA termination
notices were legally insufficient because they had failed to
specify a grounds for termination. 3 ° Moreover, GPA's
conduct and acts "were inconsistent with an intention to
extinguish such agreements and leases."' 23 ' The court
also noted that "the possibility of Braniff filing for relief
under Chapter 11 had been raised by Braniff. ' 23 2 Based
on these factors, the bankruptcy judge held that:
[a] creditor should not be permitted to terminate extremely valuable contract rights that belong to a financially
distressed debtor "by jumping the gun on what is perceived to be a race to the courthouse." . . . Where a few
hours before the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, a lessor sends a termination notice after it heard rumors of the
impending bankruptcy, without specifying the grounds for
termination, the termination is improper.233
The court then ruled that GPA had waived its termination
rights because they knew of a possible Chapter 11 filing
by Braniff.234 As an equitable matter, the court would not
permit this type of conduct by GPA and estopped its
228

Id. at 837.

229

Braniff Il, 118 B.R. at 839.

Id. at 841.
Id.
232 Id.
203 Id. (quoting In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 4 B.R. 730, 734 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
V.4 Braniff 11, 118 B.R. at 841.
230

231
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rights to terminate.235
Judge Corcoran also addressed the issue of whether
Braniff had breached the lease contract prior to the Chapter 11 filing, thereby justifying its termination. In rejecting this propostion, the court found that:
[h]earsay reports that Braniff's suppliers were not being
paid by Braniff and were refusing to deliver product to
Braniff does not amount to grounds to claim Braniff's material breach of contract for failing to pay debts as they
generally come due. Even though Braniff was delaying
payment of some suppliers, the instances in which this occurred were not sufficient in number or amount so as to be
material. Accordingly, [GPA] had no right to declare an
event of default on that basis." 6
Finally, asserting that "[c]lauses that purport to terminate agreements when action is taken to further a reorganization" are invalidated by section 365(e) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the court implied that the pre-bankruptcy acts of GPA constituted a wrongful termination
and, if allowed to stand, would "hamper the reorganization process. "1237
In sum, the court upheld the lease as an executory contract, "assumable in the future under [s]ection 365(a)"
and refused to recognize the lessor's attempt to terminate
the lease pre-petition.23 8 Given the complexity of the
transaction, the court held it inappropriate to require the
debtor to assume or reject the lease at this time, for the
moment leaving Braniff free to delay that decision until
the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.2 39 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Braniff and against GPA, declaring the
September 27th termination notices "null and void and of
no force and effect" and, conversely, reaffirming the air235

Id. at 841-42.

Id. at 842.
Id.
238 Id. at 845.
2311 Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1988) (a reorganizaing debtor may assume or
reject an unexpired lease "at any time before the confirmation of a plan").
236
237
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240
craft leases as "in full force and effect.
Of concern in this decision is the court's reliance upon
that section of the Bankruptcy Code which forbids the termination of a lease for reason of an ipso facto clause in
the underlying agreement. Specifically, section 365 states
that a lease "may not be terminated ... at any time after
the commencement of the case" due to, inter alia, the filing of a bankruptcy petition by the lessee.24 ' While the
statute inarguably voids any attempt to terminate a leasehold under an ipso facto clause once a case has been commenced, the provision in no way addresses a pre-petition
termination, as was attempted here. To be sure, the slant
of Braniff H is markedly towards an analysis of the equitable and contract law aspects of the instant controversy.
To that extent, the holding is on firm ground. Nevertheless, the ruling appears to be an unwarranted extension of
section 365 to the pre-filing acts of a lessor.
The assertion that section 365 comes into play to invalidate contractual clauses "when action is taken to further a
reorganization ' 242 seems to cut with an unnecessarily
wide swath through any number of options a concerned
party in interest might seek to employ in dealing with a
troubled entity that it fears is slipping into bankruptcy.
While the court rightfully sought in BraniffII to preserve
valuable assets of the estate and eradicate any obstacle to
the reorganization process, it seemingly did so at the expense of the lessor's freedom to act prior to a bankruptcy
filing. Indeed, the opinion's blunt statement that GPA
could not rely on its own intelligence that the lessee was
in financial straits clearly put the lessor at a disadvantage

240 BraniffH, 118 B.R. at 824-25. Although this controversy centered around
the leasing of aircraft, § 1110 was not implicated, except for an aside by the court
that the statute "does not, in and of itself, create a right to recover possession of
aircraft." Id. at 844.
241 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). See Prime Motors Inns, Inc.
v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. New Jersey (In re Prime Motors Inns, Inc.), 123 B.R.
104, 108 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (default provisions "are unenforceable and invalid pursuant to the anti-ipsofacto provisions of section 365(e)(1)").
242 BraniffI, 118 B.R. at 842.
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by forcing it to ignore valuable information and thus make
critical business decisions in a vacuum.
One unwelcome result of Branif II may be a chilling effect on transactions between lessors and distressed lessees. If Braniff II is viewed as circumscribing their rights
to terminate prior to a bankruptcy filing, lessors may feel
compelled for their own protection to terminate at a much
earlier point in time. Moreover, for a transaction not yet
final, lessors fearful of a Braniff I type outcome may be
unwilling to continue working with a troubled lessee. If a
lessor flees in self-defense from a vital transaction, that
lost opportunity may force a lessee over the precipice and
into a bankruptcy filing. Neither of these outcomes is desirable. While the court in Braniff 1I may have preserved
the rights of that carrier to its leaseholds, it may unwittingly have created a more dangerous situation for other
troubled airlines or similarly situated parties.
IX. TRANSFORMATION - NOT A SPLIT
PERSONALITY BUT A METAMORPHOSIS
The rather infamous reorganization proceedings and
subsequent liquidation of Eastern Airlines have certainly
provided a wealth of material to write about, both in the
legal and business senses. Almost overlooked, however,
was a case in which the bankruptcy court was presented
with a novel question as to whether a party who advances
funds for the purpose of financing the acquisition of aircraft, which are to be included as part of a larger pre-existing floating collateral pool, is entitled to the special
benefits provided in section 1110 of the Bankruptcy
Code.2 43 While not strictly pertaining to the aircraft lessor controversy under the statute, the fact that this case
had important ramifications for airline creditors who finance equipment acquisitions by the carriers makes it
worthy of inclusion here.
While the lower court found against the secured lend213

In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 112 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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ers, 24 4

their rights were subsequently vindicated by the appellate court. 245 This case exemplified the difficult issue
raised as to the true character of an alleged security interest where "secured revolving credit facilities under which
borrowings are used both for acquisition of aircraft and
for nonpurchase purposes. '"246
In the instant case, the moving parties seeking to take
advantage of section 1110 were the so-called "Airbus
Lenders," a consortium of European banks that has financed Eastern's acquisition of over twenty aircraft from
Airbus Industrie.247 The operative document was an indenture naming The First National Bank of Boston indenture trustee, 248 whereby Eastern had borrowed funds
from these and other lenders, as evidenced by notes,
which in turn were secured by "a floating collateral pool
consisting of aircraft, aircraft engines, and various spare
parts. ' 24 9 The collateral pool had an approximate fair
market value of $820 million, while the principal sum of
the notes held by the Airbus Lenders was less than $100
million. 25 0 Eastern submitted that the indenture was
never intended to grant a PMESI to the Airbus Lenders,
and that they were "merely generally secured creditors
...not entitled to the protections afforded by [section]
1110. ' 25 ' The secured lenders cross-moved the court to
find that they did indeed possess a PMESI, and, pursuant
to section 1110, Eastern should be compelled to either
cure all defaults and maintain current payments or surrenId. at 89.
See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 123
B.R. 166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
246 Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 7, at 19.
247 The Airbus Lenders consisted of Dresdner Bank, A.G., Bayerische Verinshank, Deutsche Bank, A.G., Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, Keditanstalt
fur Wederaufbau, Credit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de Paris, Societe Generale,
Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur, and Midland Bank PLC. In re Ionosphere Clubs, 112 B.R. at 80.
248 Id. at 79.
249 Id. at 80.
250 Id. at 80-81.
2. Id. at 81.
244
245

19921

REORGANIZING AIRLINES

891

der the Airbus aircraft.252
Chief Bankruptcy Judge Lifland ruled that the Airbus
Lenders did not possess a PMESI in the specific aircraft at
issue and, therefore, could not utilize the special protections of section 11 10. In doing so, the court began with
the premise that "the terms in [section] 1110 must be narrowly construed.., before a creditor may receive the protection it offers. '2 5 3 For this reason, the bankruptcy court
concluded that it must determine if the Airbus Lenders
held a PMESI.254 The court held that they did not.
Analyzing the law of secured transactions, Judge Lifland cited the general rule that if collateral secures debt
other than its own price, it is not a PMESI. 255 The fact
that the loan to Eastern was secured by the floating collateral pool, and not by the specific Airbus aircraft, was fatal
to the claimed PMESI of the Airbus Lenders.256 In addition, the court found that the indenture instrument itself
called for the notes to be equally and ratably secured,
without priority or distinction. To be sure, the collateral
pool secured the obligations of Eastern to some thirtyeight other lenders for transactions unrelated to the
Airbus purchases, but which were nonetheless included in
the indenture.25 7 Likewise, the contention that the notes
could be linked to particular aircraft acquisitions was
downplayed. The court found the equal and ratable language in the indenture dispositive.258 Lastly, looking to
the operative document, Chief Judge Lifland ruled that
the indenture reserved the right of enforcing any security

2-53

Id.
Id. at 82.

254

Id.

252

Id. See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1975). In re Manuel has been cited as the leading case espousing the "transformation" rule, which holds that "the addition of more collateral or more secured debt
to the purchase-money security agreement transforms the PMESI to a nonPMESI." Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 7, at 19.
256 In re Ionosphere Clubs, 112 B.R. at 82.
257 Id. at 83.
256 Id. at 84-85.
255
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interest to the indenture trustee, not individual parties.259
The Airbus Lenders were thus left without a remedy, even
if they had a right. The court's finding on the last issue is
particularly instructive. The court held that the Airbus
Lenders, by agreeing to secure their notes by the indenture and the floating collateral pool, relinquished rights
they might have otherwise had retained in a separate se2 60
curity agreement.
In his conclusion, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Lifland
stated:
Although the Airbus Lenders undeniably made "equipment specific" loans, they did not however, take back the
kind of purchase money equipment security interests afforded protection under [section] 1110. Based upon the
express terms of the operative documents executed in
connection with the issuance and collateralization of the
Airbus Notes, it is clear that the Airbus Lenders do not,
and were never intended to, possess a PMESI in the
Airbus Aircraft.2 6 '
For these reasons, the bankruptcy court denied the Airbus
Lenders the protection of section 1 110, and conversely
determined those parties were "merely generally secured
26 2
creditors of Eastern.

The federal district court judge deciding the Airbus
Lenders' appeal now faced this troublesome bankruptcy
court decision. In First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Shugrue,263
the Airbus Lenders asked for a reversal of the bankruptcy
court's finding that the security interests they held were
not exempted from the automatic stay by section 111 0 of
259

Id. at 88.

260 Id. at 89.

Id.
Id.
263In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 123 B.R. 166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)[hereinafter First Nat'1]. This case exemplifies the extended time commitment a financier
must make in an aircraft transaction. The original indenture was created in 1963,
and the Airbus Lenders extended credit to Eastern to finance the aircraft acquisitions in 1978 and again in 1981. Id. at 169. In other words, at the time of the
airline's bankruptcy filing the relevant financing agreements ranged in age from
eight to twenty-six years old.
261

262
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the Bankruptcy Code. Judge Sweet made his review de
novo, as "the facts are not in dispute, and appellants challenge only the legal conclusions of the Bankruptcy
Court.'"26
As its opening premise, the district court set out that if
section 1110's provisions are complied with, a court is
without power to futher limit a creditors' statutorily
granted rights. 65 Judge Sweet stated that the first question before him was whether the Airbus Lenders' security
interests in the Airbus aircraft constituted PMESIs 66
Since the Bankruptcy Code did not define "security interest," the court turned to the UCC. 267 Section 9-107 of the
UCC specifies that a security interest is a "purchase
money security interest" to the extent that it is (a) taken
or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who, by making
advances or incurring an obligation, enables the debtor to
acquire rights in or the use of collateral. 68 Under this approach the court felt that the relevant question was
whether the financing party takes an interest in the collateral as security for the purchase price obligation, not
whether the purchased property also served or will serve
as collateral for other debts of the purchaser. 6 9
The airline claimed that First National, the indenture
trustee, and not the Airbus Lenders as creditors, had sole
authority to seize property in the collateral pool.2 70 Judge
Sweet disagreed, holding that section 1110 "by its own
terms applies to situations in which a trustee holds the security interest for the benefit of the actual creditor."' 27'
26
Id. at 171. See also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1978) (appeals to district court of
bankruptcy court decisions).
265 First Nat'l, 123 B.R. at 169 (citing In re Air Vermont, 761 F.2d at 134).
26 In fact, the aircraft themselves had already been sold. The sale proceeds
were being held in escrow as the deemed equivalent of the jets, pending appeal to
determine the parties' respective rights. First Nat'l, 123 B.R. at 170.
267 Id.
26
Id. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978).

269 First Nat'l, 123 B.R. at 171.
270
271

Id. at 170.
Id.
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The district court, unlike the bankruptcy judge, held that
the Airbus Lenders unquestionably took security interests
in the aircraft as consideration for the loan. 72 In light of
the UCC, the court found the banks held PMESIs, and the
fact that the jets became part of the floating collateral
pool did not take the transaction outside the scope of
UCC section 9-107.273
Judge Sweet then examined the bankruptcy court's conclusion that, even if PMESIs existed initially, they were
subsequently eradicated by the inclusion of the Airbus aircraft in the floating collateral pool. 274 Judge Sweet noted
that the bankruptcy court had relied upon the so-called
"transformation" rule, in deciding this issue, that is, when
PMESI collateral is commingled with non-PMESI collateral, the PMESI is destroyed.27 5
Ultimately, the district court found that "the more modern trend is to recognize that only the security interest
which secures the non-purchase price debt is not a
PMESI, but the interest which secures the purchase price
debt retains its PMESI character. 2 76 In so doing, the
court rejected the "transformation" rule in favor of the
"dual status" rule. 2 " Judge Sweet stated that:
The important point here is that it is the security interest
which has the dual status, not the loan which it secures.
To the extent that the security interest gives the creditor
the right to seize the collateral because of a default on the
purchase price obligation, it is a PMESI, and to the extent
that it allows seizure because of defaults on other loans, it
is non-PMESI. 78
Id. at 171.
Id. at 170-71.
274 In re Ionosphere Clubs, 112 B.R. at 84-86.
275 First Nat', 123 B.R. at 171.
276 Id. (followed by In re Pan Am Corp., 124 B.R. 960, 971 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(Blackshear, J.), affd in part, 125 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), afd, 929 F.2d 109
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2248 (1991)).
277 See Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d 797, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1984)
272

273

(holding that "a security interest can have a 'dual status' and that the presence of
a nonpurchase money security interest does not destroy the purchase money
aspect.").
278 First Nat'l, 123 B.R. at 172.
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Taking a pragmatic approach, the court observed that
for this principle to be workable, the debtor's payments
must be "clearly allocated to each of its obligations....
Of course, where the obligations are owed to different
creditors, there is no problem in allocating payments to
each individual loan. ' 279 Given the relative sophistication
of these parties, the less complex nature of the instant situation was in sharp contrast to the "typical consumer
credit case," where lump sum payments are not clearly allocated to the purchase price of individual pieces of collateral, thereby complicating any utilization of the "dual
status" rule.28 °
The court also reversed the bankruptcy court's finding
that an allocation of Eastern's payments to specific loans
was not possible. Rather, Judge Sweet found that particular loans financed the purchase of each individual Airbus
jet, making the apportionment task relatively simple.2 '
Lastly, Judge Sweet focused on the fact that the bankruptcy judge had indicated below that section 1110 did
not apply because any recovery by the Airbus Lenders
would be shared with Lazard Brothers & Co., Ltd., another holder of notes from Eastern. 8
District Judge
Sweet easily disposed of that holding, ruling instead that
the Airbus Lenders were "free to share the benefits of
their PMESIs" with other Eastern creditors secured by the
indenture, "without destroying the purchase quality of
those interests.... [T]he situation is at least analogous to
Id.
Id. at 173 n.4. A leading commentary has opined as follows:
While the dual status rule appears to be gaining dominance among
both commentators and courts, there is even more reason to prefer
this rule in the sophisticated context of aircraft financings. Unlike
consumer debtors, air carriers are sophisticated borrowers in heavily
negotiated transactions, and can surely be presumed to know the
importance of granting a PMSI in aircraft. Use of the transformation
rule, which terminates purchase-money status regardless of the intent of the parties, would harm the ability of air carriers to refinance
debt.
Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 7, at 21 (footnote omitted).
21," First Nat'l, 123 B.R. at 173.
21 Id. at 173 (citing In re Ionosphere Clubs, 112 B.R. at 85-87).
279
28
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a partial assignment of the benefits of the benefits of the
PMESI to Lazard, and Eastern has offered no justifiction
2 3
for rejecting that analogy.
In conclusion, the district court explicitly advocated the
"dual status" rule, finding a majority of cases have chosen
to apply that principle rather than the "transformation"
rule. Since the lenders' PMESI's were therefore unaltered, their security interest qualified under section 1110
28 4
for exemption from the automatic stay.
The relevance of Judge Sweet's ruling is its application
of the "dual status" rule to the complex world of aircraft
finance. His opinion highlights the rising pre-eminence
of that doctrine and the decline of the competing "transformation" rule. To secured creditors financing aircraft
and other "floating collateral" in the airline industry, such
judicial acceptance of a rule more favorable to the preservation of PMESI's will assist such lenders in enforcing
their rights to valuable collateral, even when confronted
with the intervention of the debtor airline's bankruptcy.
X.

THE FUTURE IS NOW FOR SECTION 1110

As we near the end of this discussion, we can review the
last year's controversies with the unmistakable clarity of
hindsight. The tremors caused by the airline bankruptcies
of the past year have underscored the critical need for judicious use of the Bankruptcy Code, with an enlightened
view towards creditors and lesssors, as well as the reorganizing debtor and the flying public.28 5 Subsequent cases
proved that Continental I misconstrued the Congressional
purpose behind section 1110, as the legislative history
does state that the "protection of security interests was
added to make financing forms more flexible and conso283

First Nat'l, 123 B.R. at 174.

284

Id.

285 SeeJames

T. McKenna, Bankruptcy Laws Misused in Attempts to Stop Grounding of
Eastern, Pan Am, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 13, 1992, at 47.
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nant with the modem law." 286 While this must be balanced against the legislative intent to -exclude general
mortgages from the statute's special protections, 287 the
better reasoned opinions of BraniffI, PanAm I, Continental
H, and Continental III tell us that a sale-leaseback qualifies
as one of the modern "financing forms" Congress intended to protect in section 1 110. An additional point to
be made here is that normally the lessor and the carrier
still create a one-to-one relationship between the debt
and the collateral in a sale-leaseback, an aspect of no
small importance when distinguishing the acquisition
288
from an ordinary mortgage interest.
What remains to be seen, however, is how successful
the lessors are in lobbying Congress to reaffirm and
strengthen the special attributes of section 1110.289 Given
the competing interests of certain airlines struggling to
survive, lenders and lessors seeking to increase their protections, and healthy air carriers wanting to maintain the
status quo in the capital markets, the coming debate in the
halls of Congress should be an interesting one. Even as
the controversy made its rounds through the circuit
courts of appeals, "[miore than a dozen transportation
companies, lessors and lenders involved in sale-leaseback
transactions" formed a group to jointly lobby Congress to
clarify section 1110.290
To be sure, aircraft lessors have joined forces with the
manufacturers, purchasers, and financiers of aircraft and
railroad equipment to urge the Congress to "remove a
cloud of uncertainty that is now preventing some transactions from going forward, needlessly delaying others, and
raising the costs of all other capital equipment financing
286

H.R. REP. 595, supra note 23, at 240, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963,

6200.

287Id.
288See Southtrust Bank of Alabama, Nat'l Assoc. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243 (11 th Cir. 1985).
219Wade Lambert & Ellen J. Pollack, Airlines and Lenders Join To Lobby For Bankruptcy - Law Clarification, WALL ST.J., Apr. 23, 1991, at B16.
2%Id.
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transactions."129 ' The aircraft lobby reminds Congress
that the lawmakers have historically recognized the need
to encourage equipment financing transactions, and so
provided special protections in section 1110. Without
that aegis, the costs of financing would rise in accordance
with the perceived risk of entering into unprotected aircraft leases. The dramatic rise of recent airline bankruptcies merely served to exacerbate that confusion, and the
lobby contended that "[i]t is a demonstrated fact ... that
the resulting uncertainty has raised the cost of financing."' 292 In particular, the members of the lobby do not
want their equipment tied up for months or years in bankruptcy court disputes. 93 In testimony, this group emphasized the very real danger that, given the time expended
on discovery, trial, and appeals, the sixty day period of
section 1110 would have long evaporated, leaving the lessor with none of the protections it envisioned when it entered into the transaction. 94
The lessor community is concerned that the recent airline bankruptcy litigations have shrouded the special protections of section 1110 in uncertainty. To dispel any
doubts as to the continuance of the privileges Congress
originally legislated, the aircraft lessors have now asked
Congress to strengthen the statute. 295 To be sure, the les291 Senators Mull Proposals to Clarify Code with Regard to PBGC, Trusts, Aircraft, 3
Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 895, 897 (Aug. 1, 1991) (quoting testimony of John J.
Salmon).

292

Id.

29

Id.

Id. at 898.
Id. at 897. While not authoritative, various proposals to amend section 1110
are in circulation. One call for a rather simple set of modifications is to delete
references to "purchase money," thereby including generic security interests
within the statute's protection. This minor change may alleviate some of the technical disputes as to the threshold matter of the classification of the security interest. Under this provision, section 1110 would simply protect all security interests,
conditional sales, and leases. Other proposals seek to protect lessors by extending
monetary compensation. These revisions would permit lessors to file a priority
administrative claim for monies expended to protect the aircraft, in the event the
debtor-in-possession or the trustee does not fulfill its obligations to cure defaults
within the first sixty days after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Letter from Eloise
L. Morgan, attorney, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, to Anthony Sabino,
2-

295
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sors concerns may be well placed. The financing of fleet
acquisitions is sure to remain an issue of major import,
with the stakes ranging into the billions of dollars. 96 As
the airlines, lessors, and financiers are still sorting
through the wreckage of the defunct carriers, the pace of
technology and global expansion demands an immediate
response to the next phase of fleet modernization.
As an example of what is at stake, consider Airbus Industrie, the subsidized European consortium, that recently reported a backlog of orders for 1,600 planes,
"worth a cool $70 billion. '2 97 In addition, industry behemoth Boeing estimates that the world airlines "will spend
2' 98
$617 billion on new planes over the next 15 years.
Without a doubt, financing the modernization of the airline fleets that will carry passengers into the 21st century
demands a comprehensive and conclusive review of section 1110. Certainly, recent judicial rulings have had a
calming influence and allayed many of the creditors fears
caused by Continental I. But with the current talk of bankruptcy reform, surely a fine tuning of the special protections of section 1110 is appropriate and necessary.
Few would argue that recent litigation developments
now compel a re-examination of section 1110, with a view
towards augmenting the special protections now provided
airline creditors. This is simply a healthy result of the
fractious court cases and is already underway. Nonetheless, one must be mindful that the same rulings which
have led to the present call for reform also exemplify the
durability of section 1110. Notwithstanding some early
concerns, the statute and, furthermore, its underlying legislative history, have proven themselves solid under the
attorney, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae (Oct. 16, 1991) (on file with Southern
Methodist University Law Review Association) (regarding proposed amendment
to section 1110).
2.
Kelly & Oneal, supra note 67, at 84. "[T]he aircraft finance business faces a
major shakeout" given the hard times that have befallen air carriers. Id.
297 Stewart Toy and Michael Oneal, Zoom!Airbus Comes on Strong, Bus. WK., Apr.
22, 1991, at 48.
298 Id. at 49.
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light of judicial scrutiny. Not only did section 1110 continue to extend its enhanced protections to its own special
class of creditors, the law also proved itself progressive
enough to include within its statutory penumbra ultramodern transactional forms that its forbear could not
have conceived.
For these reasons, it is suggested here that the current
efforts directed at retooling section 1110 generally should
leave the law intact. Instead of instituting major change,
minor mid-course corrections would be more appropriate. Such remedial measures would clarify the fact that
the statute prevails over all forms of leases, both established and innovative. Concurrently, the somewhat confusing reference which includes only PMESI-type
mortgages within the unique protections of section 1110
could be restated to make it plain that this acquisitionsonly restriction is intended for secured creditors, and not
lessors or vendors. Indeed, a more definitive statement of
what exactly constitutes a PMESI would not be beyond
the scope of such revisions.
Another point of great trepidation in the recent cases
was the impact of the true lease versus disguised security
interest controversy on creditors' rights pursuant to section 1110. Here, some provision may be made to assure
creditors that their ability to, among other things, repossess collateral should continue unabated, notwithstanding
the stalling tactics of a desperate debtor. To do otherwise
would eviscerate the special protections of the law, as the
judicial rulings have pointed out. In fairness to a debtor
who may ultimately prevail on the allegation that the creditor is merely a disguised general creditor unworthy of
section 1110's unique aegis, procedures to expedite that
determination or otherwise ameliorate the harm to the
debtor (such as an enhanced recovery of property or
money damages to dissuade abusers of the statute) might
be incorporated into a revised section 1110.
To be sure, all of the foregoing is consistent with the
history and present structure of the statute, and also accu-
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rately reflects recent judicial interpretations. In sum, section 1110 is an eminently sound provision, which has
proven to work well. For that reason, a precise fine-tuning is all that is necessary.
As a parting thought, it is asserted here that any reformation of section 1110 must be guided by this unassailable truism:
The bankruptcy laws traditionally have afforded special
treatment to certain lenders to targeted transportation industries, to encourage the financing necessary to capitalize
and equip industries deemed vital to the nation's growth
and survival. 99
XI.

CONCLUSION

The turmoil in the airline industry for the last year has
most certainly exacted its price, not only in defunct and
dismembered carriers, but in the heavy legal and business
expenses associated with the battles between debtor airlines and creditors over their respective rights to assets.
Yet some long-term good has come from this painful and
laborious process. Notwithstanding the initial anxiety,
aircraft lessors and similarly situated creditors gained
conclusive court victories that interpret section 1110 of
the Bankruptcy Code in their favor. Not only did these
decisions maintain the unique protections of the statute
for the benefit of these special creditors, the judicial outlook was one of willingness to accommodate new and innovative constructs of aircraft finance, as long as the
legislative goal of fleet modernization was served.
This bodes well for the stability of past transactions that
have been or shall be questioned in airline bankruptcies.
In an otherwise bleak economy, the financial community
can at least be confident that the enormous amounts of
capital it has committed to the air carriers still possess
some degree of safety. This inures not only to the benefit
of the creditors but also to solvent airlines who thereby
299

Goldman et al., supra note 9, at 30.
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find a stable marketplace when they seek out fresh capital.
A safe course has now been charted for future aircraft
financings, offering hope that the next generation of
superjets will be able to join the fleets of the increasingly
global airlines.
As a general matter, the court opinions discussed
herein are relevant to the general laws of bankruptcy and
creditors' rights as well. Witness the firm adherence to
the "plain meaning" doctrine of statutory interpretation,
accompanied by the judicious use of legislative history.
No less important was the rejection of marginal doctrines
or even the temptation to engage in judicial tinkering with
the letter of the law. Again, these troubled times demand
some certainty and consistency in the application of the
Bankruptcy Code. While dealing primarily with but one
specialized provision of that enactment, these courts have
nevertheless provided an example well worth following
elsewhere.
Of course, legitimate concerns have arisen as to the
structure of section 1110 and related provisions. Such is
the natural outcome of the tumult of litigation that highlighted the recent airline bankruptcies. No doubt, a little
fine-tuning of the Bankruptcy Code is in order. However,
it would seem that the paramount result of these reorganization proceedings is to prove the resiliency of section
1110. Certainly, the provision made it through the most
foul of weather to achieve a safe landing. It demonstrated
it is just as applicable to the latest in corporate finance
inventions as its predecessors were to the comparatively
straightforward transactions of years past. For these reasons, a mild refinement, carefully thought out and considered, is all that is needed. To do otherwise might risk
hard-won victories and assure an uncertain future for the
entire airline industry.
In closing, this was at first a year of very unfriendly skies
for creditors. The worst may be forthcoming for the air
carriers. The all-important parties who finance the airlines, however, can proceed with confidence, knowing that
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this was the year they emerged triumphant in maintaining
the special protections given them by section 1110 of the
Bankruptcy Code.

Comments

